Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination?

• Author: Julie Wilhelmsen, Kristian Lundby Gjerde
• Position: Senior Researcher
• Pages: 292-317

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Citation: Julie Wilhelmsen & Kristian Lundby Gjerde. “Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New Cold War Contamination?”

Arctic Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 9, 2018, pp. 382–407. http://dx.doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v9.1334

*Correspondence to: Julie Wilhelmsen, email: jw@nupi.no

Arctic Review on Law and Politics

Vol. 9, 2018, pp. 382–407

382

Peer-reviewed article

Norway and Russia in the Arctic: New

Cold War Contamination?

Julie Wilhelmsen

Senior Researcher, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

Kristian Lundby Gjerde

Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI)

Abstract

The standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine has already obstructed cooperation

across a range of issues. Could it also affect state interaction between Norway and Russia in the

Arctic—an area and a relationship long characterized by a culture of compromise and/or coop-

eration? Here we start from the theoretical premise that states are not pre-constituted political

entities, but are constantly in the making. How Russia views its own role and how it views other

actors in the Arctic changes over time, calling for differing approaches. That holds true for Nor-

way as well. To clarify the premises for interaction between Russia and Norway in the Arctic, we

scrutinize changes in ofcial discourse on Self and Other in the Arctic on both sides in the period

2012 to 2016, to establish what kind of policy mode—“realist,” “institutionalist,” or “diplomatic

management”—has underlain the two countries’ ofcial discourse in that period. Has Norway

continued to pursue “balancing” policies undertaken in the realist mode with those in the diplo-

matic management mode? Which modes have characterized Russia’s approach toward Norway?

Finding that realist-mode policies increasingly dominate on both sides, in the conclusion we dis-

cuss how the changing mode of the one state affects that of the other, and why a New Cold War is

now spreading to the Arctic.

Keywords: Arctic, Russia, Norway, security, discourse, New Cold War

Responsible Editor: Helge Blakkisrud, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

(NUPI).

Received: August 2018; Accepted: November 2018; Published: December 2018

Norway and Russia in the Arctic

383

1. Introduction

Since the Ukraine crisis erupted in 2014, Russian–Western relations have plummeted

dramatically. Despite the different historical setting, there are striking similarities to

the Cold War, one being that the globally interlinked nature of that conict meant

that “trouble in one area metastasized to others.”1 The standoff over Ukraine has

already obstructed cooperation across various issues. Could it also affect state inter-

action between two countries in the Arctic—a region that has in recent decades been

dened primarily by a culture of compromise2 or a spirit of cooperation?3 This article

examines changes in the premises of Norwegian and Russian state interaction in the

Arctic: how ofcial views and narratives have changed before and after the crises

in Ukraine, 2012–2016.4 What kind of policy mode—“realist,” “institutionalist,” or

“diplomatic management” (see introduction to this thematic cluster)—characterizes

Norwegian and Russian ofcial discourse? How have changes in policy mode affected

interaction between these two Arctic states?

Even during the Cold War, with security concerns in focus, a culture of compro-

mise was achieved by balancing policies undertaken in the realist mode with those

pursued in the diplomatic management mode. Seeking to understand the premises

for interaction between Norway and Russia in the Arctic, we ask whether Norway has

kept this balance in the period 2012–2016—and which modes characterize Russia’s

approach toward Norway during the same period. We conclude with a discussion of

how the changing policy modes of the one state have affected changes in the other.

The article offers two contributions: to the current public debate, and to the aca-

demic debate on Russian–Western relations. First, we challenge the widespread

assumption that states have unchanging, set modes of foreign policy: that Western

states are necessarily “cooperative,” whereas Russia, reverting to its “true self,” is nec-

essarily “assertive.” Second, emphasizing how the character of relations is determined

not solely by the foreign policy of one state, but by the combination of the foreign

policies of several states, this article expands the academic literature on Russian–

Western relations in the Arctic and beyond in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. A more

nuanced understanding of Arctic interactions between Norway and Russia can help

to explain the extent to which—and how—the crisis in Russian–Western relations is

“contaminating” the Arctic.

We study Norway’s changing approach to Russia in particular detail, for several

reasons. First, this article is part of a thematic cluster where other contributions cover

various aspects of Russian policies in the Arctic in depth. Here, we aim to show how

the policies of even a small state like Norway can interact with and play into the poli-

cies of Russia in the Arctic. Second, Norwegian government ofcials are far more

preoccupied with Russia than Russia is with Norway, and thus talk about Russia

to a much greater degree. This reects the core identities of these two states, their

representations of Self and Other, and the status of the Arctic in ofcial national

discourses. We have selected the period 2012–2016—two years before and two years