Russian Proposals on the Polar Code: Contributing to Common Rules or Furthering State Interests?

• Author: Dorottya Bognar
• Pages: 3-27

Russian Proposals on the Polar Code:

Contributing to Common Rules or

Furthering State Interests?

Dorottya Bognar*,

PhD Candidate, Department of Sociology, Political Science and Community Planning,

Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education, UiT - The Arctic University of

Norway, Tromsø, Norway

Abstract

The mandatory Polar Code was finally adopted by the Inte rnational Maritime Organization (IMO) in

May 2015. The present article examines the role and contribution of the Russian Federation in the

decision-making process of the Polar Code through its proposals, in the form of submissions, statements,

and oral interventions. The purpose of these proposals is investigated with respect to the safety and

environmental protection goals of the IMO and Russian interests in the Arctic, by looking at the reasoning

used by Russia in its proposals. The major issue areas represented in the Russian proposals include,

among others, the role of coastal State legislation, environmental regulations, and icebreaker assistance;

however,the majority of these do not contribute to the IMO’s goals of creating globally uniform standards

for maritime safety and protecting the marine environment. The Russian proposals served State interests

through misrepresentation and reference to Russia’sexperience in Arctic shipping. While the latter frames

Russia as a leading user of Arctic waters, the role that Russia played in the Polar Code negotiations

indicates that Russia has more than shipping interests to protect in the Arctic.

Keywords: Arctic shipping;International Maritime Organization;decision-making;

law of the sea;Northern Sea Route

Responsible Editor: Tore Henriksen, Professor, Director K.G. Jebsen Centre for the

LawoftheSea,FacultyofLaw,UniversityofTromsø-TheArcticUniversityof

Norway.

Received: March 2016; Accepted: June 2016; Published: November 2016

1. Introduction

The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters(Polar Code) was adopted

by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in November 2014 and May

2015,

1

after years of negotiations. Once it comes into force through amendments to the

*Correspondence to: Dorottya Bognar, Department of Sociology, Political Science and Commu-

nity Planning, Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education, UiT - The Arctic University

of Norway, PB 6050 Langnes, 9037 Tromsø, Norway. Email: dorottya.bognar@uit.no

Arctic Review on Law and Politics

Vol. 7, No. 2, 2016, pp. 111135

#2016 D. Bognar. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-

NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), allowing third parties to

copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format and to remix, transform, and build upon the material for any

purpose, even commercially, provided the original work is properly cited and states its license.

Citation: D. Bognar. ‘‘Russian Proposals on the Polar Code: Contributing to Common Rules or Furthering State Interests?’’

Arctic Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2016, pp. 111135. http://dx.doi.org/10.17585/arctic.v7.415 111

SOLAS

2

and MARPOL

3

Conventions,

4

this new instrument will regulate ship safety

and pollution prevention in polar waters. While the Polar Code covers both the Arctic

and the Antarctic waters, the present article deals specifically with one Arctic State,

the Russian Federation, and its contribution to the negotiation process that resulted in

the Polar Code.

Russia is an important player in the Arctic from many perspectives. It has the longest

coastline facing the Arctic; the largest Arctic population of all the Arctic States; and a

proud reputation, history, and identity connected to the Arctic.

5

Furthermore,

because of the resource wealth of its Arctic Zone,

6

comprising hydrocarbons, timber,

minerals, as well as fish, Russia also has important industries located in the area,

providing a significant percentage of its GDP and export.

7

With its long Arctic

coastline, Russia also has considerable experience in Arctic shipping. While shipping

activity in the Russian Arctic is mainly connected to resource extraction in the region

and supply routes to remote communities, part of the current Russian Arctic policy is

to encourage the use of the waters off Russia’s Arctic coast, the Northern Sea Route

(NSR),

8

for international transit shipping.

9

Much of the shipping activity in Russian

waters is supported by different services, such as icebreaker assistance and pilotage.

To make shipping through the NSR easier, new legislation was enacted with regard to

the NSR in 2012 and 2013.

10

The main question this article seeks to answer is how Russia’s role and contribution

to the Polar Code may be characterised. In order to answer this question, the following

sub-questions are raised: 1) Did Russia have a prominent role in the negotiation of

the Polar Code? and 2) Looking at the content of its proposals, did Russia utilise its

experience in Arctic shipping to further the IMO’s goals or its own interests?

Section 2 of this article introduces the material on which the research has been based.

Section 3 examines the first sub-question raised above, with the hypothesis that

Russia’s size and stakes in the Arctic made it one of the most interested players in the

Polar Code negotiations. Section 4 deals with the content of selected Russian propo-

sals, statements, and interventions, in light of the second sub-question. First,

I introduce deliberative theory’s distinction between arguing and bargaining to help

the analysis, and define the IMO’s goals in the context of the Polar Code. The hypo-

thesis made is that, while Russia has fur thered its own narrow self-interests in the polar

region, it has also been interested in enhancing safety and environmental protection

through the new Polar Code, especially since the waters north of Russia are expected to

open for ship traffic first. Thus, I will consider which Russian interests were promoted

through the Russian proposals and how these were furthered, in order to determine

whether the Russian proposals served the IMO’s goals or particular State interests.

Finally, building on the previous analyses, Section 5 discusses what Russia’s participa-

tion in the Polar Code negotiations can tell us about what kind of Arctic actor Russia is.

2. Research material

During the decision-making process of the IMO, its members and observers submit

proposals that are discussed in the different Committees, Sub-Committees, working

D. Bognar

112