Alignment but not Alliance: Nordic Operational Military Cooperation

• Author: Hakon Lunde Saxi
• Position: Command and Staff College/Norwegian Defence University College, Norway
• Pages: 53-71

© 2022 Håkon Lunde Saxi. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons

CC-BY4.0 License. eISSN 2387-4562. https://arcticreview.no.

Citation: Håkon Lunde Saxi. “Alignment but not Alliance: Nordic Operational Military Cooperation” Arctic Review on Law

and Politics, Vol. 13, 2022, pp. 53–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v13.3380

Arctic Review on Law and Politics

Vol. 13, 2022, pp. 53–71

53

Correspondence to: Håkon Lunde Saxi, e-mail: hsaxi@mil.no

Peer-reviewed article

Alignment but not Alliance: Nordic

Operational Military Cooperation

Håkon Lunde Saxi

Command and Staff College/Norwegian Defence University College, Norway

Abstract

Since the start of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, the Nordic states have sought to advance their

defence cooperation “beyond peacetime” to also encompass operational military cooperation in

crisis and armed conict. Relations between the two Nordic non-NATO members, Sweden and

Finland, have formed a vanguard, encompassing bilateral operational planning beyond peacetime.

While no formal security policy guarantees have been exchanged, Sweden and Finland have cre-

ated strong expectations that they will lend each other support in a crisis. In short, while no formal

alliance treaty exists, the two states have nevertheless become closely aligned. In 2020, Sweden and

Finland joined NATO member Norway in signalling their intention to strengthen their trilateral

defence relationship. The following year, NATO members Norway and Denmark signed a similar

agreement with Sweden. The goal of these documents was to coordinate their national operational

plans – their “war plans” – and perhaps develop some common operational plans. In this article, it

is argued that these agreements fall short of a formal military alliance, but that they represent an

alignment policy between the Nordic states.

Keywords: Nordic Defence Cooperation, NORDEFCO, operational planning, Nordic

security, alliance policy, alignment policy, defence policy, NATO

Responsible Editor: Njord Wegge, Norwegian Defence University College, Norway

Received: July 2021; Accepted: January 2022; Published: March 2022

In September 2020, the ministers of defence from Norway, Sweden and Finland met

at Porsangmoen, Norway, to sign a document on enhanced trilateral military coop-

eration. The venue was carefully selected. Located approximately 200km from the

Russian border, the Garrison of Porsanger was the sight of the ongoing build-up of

Norway’s Army and Home Guard’s combined land forces in Finnmark, the country’s

Håkon Lunde Saxi

54

northern most county. It was also at the heart of the geographical area known as the

Cap of the North (Nordkalotten in Norwegian and Swedish), often used to describe

the geographical area of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia located north of the

Arctic Circle. While no representative from the Russian Federation was present, and

no mention was made of Russia in the document itself nor in the accompanying

trilateral opinion piece published by the ministers, Russia’s presence nevertheless

loomed over the ceremony. When asked why the document was important, Swedish

Minster of Defence Peter Hultqvist replied that it sent “a clear signal to Russia”.1

The document itself was entitled “Statement of Intent on Enhanced Operational

Cooperation” and numbered only three short pages.2 As a statement of intent, the

document signalled only the intention of the three countries involved and did not

contain any legally binding commitments. Moreover, it did not substitute for or

invalidate any existing defence agreements.3 Nevertheless, it arguably had the poten-

tial to advance Norway’s operational defence cooperation with Sweden and Finland

considerably. The document instructed the countries’ ministries of defence and

armed forces to begin discussing their respective national operational plans with the

aim of exploring the possibility of being able to “coordinate” these plans “in areas

of common concern”. The document also highlighted the possibility of developing

“common” operational plans “in certain areas”.4

In September 2021, almost exactly a year after the Porsangmoen-meeting, the

ministers of defence from Norway, Sweden and Denmark signed an almost identi-

cal “Statement of Intent on Enhanced Operational Cooperation”.5 The document

was almost word-for-word identical to the one signed the year before, except that

it identied the “areas of common concern” as “the southern parts of Scandinavia

(Kattegat, Skagerrak, the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Danish straits and other

surrounding areas as required)”.6 In short, coordinated and common operational

planning was extended to the southern shores of Scandinavia. Since Sweden and

Finland had already signed an agreement to develop common operational plans in

the Baltic Sea area several years previously,7 the Nordic states had in effect agreed to

attempt to coordinate their operational military plans dealing with the Scandinavian

peninsula, Finland, and most of the adjacent maritime areas.

This article will explore the signicance of these new agreements on operational

military cooperation. The main argument is that these agreements have continued a

process which began in 2014, to take Nordic military cooperation “beyond peace-

time” and enable two or more Nordic states to undertake combined joint oper-

ations in wartime. The objective is enhancing deterrence vis-à-vis Russia, and, if

deterrence should fail, enhanced Nordic defence. In order to do this, the article

rst explores the closely related concepts of alliance and alignment. I argue that

the present movement towards enhanced Nordic operational military cooperation

represents the latter rather than the former. Secondly, the article untangles what

national military operational plans are and examines how the Nordic states have

revitalised their national operational planning in the face of a deteriorating external