Asian Countries and Arctic Shipping: Policies, Interests and Footprints on Governance

• Author: Arild Moe, Olav Schram Stokke
• Position: Research Professor
• Pages: 168-196

Arctic Review on Law and Politics

Vol. 10, 2019, pp. 24–52

24

Peer-reviewed article

© 2019 Arild Moe & Olav Schram Stokke. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Com-

mons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), allowing

third parties to share their work (copy, distribute, transmit) and to adapt it, under the condition that the authors are given

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license are made clear.

Citation: Arild Moe & Olav Schram Stokke. “Asian Countries and Arctic Shipping: Policies, Interests and Footprints on

Governance” Arctic Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 10, 2019, pp. 24–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v10.1374

*Correspondence to: Arild Moe, email: arild.moe@fni.no

Asian Countries and Arctic Shipping:

Policies, Interests and Footprints on

Governance

Arild Moe*

Fridtjof Nansen Institute

Olav Schram Stokke

University of Oslo, Department of Political Science, and Fridtjof Nansen Institute

Abstract

Most studies of Asian state involvement in Arctic affairs assume that shorter sea-lanes to Europe

are a major driver of interest, so this article begins by examining the prominence of shipping con-

cerns in Arctic policy statements made by major Asian states. Using a bottom-up approach, we

consider the advantages of Arctic sea routes over the Suez and Panama alternatives in light of the

political, bureaucratic and economic conditions surrounding shipping and shipbuilding in China,

Japan and the Republic of Korea. Especially Japanese and Korean policy documents indicate

soberness rather than optimism concerning Arctic sea routes, noting the remaining limitations and

the need for in-depth feasibility studies. That policymakers show greater caution than analysts,

links in with our second nding: in Japan and Korea, maritime-sector bureaucracies responsible

for industries with Arctic experience have been closely involved in policy development, more so

than in China. Thirdly, we nd a clear tendency towards rising industry-level caution and restraint

in all three countries, reecting nancial difculties in several major companies as well as growing

sensitivity to the economic and political risks associated with the Arctic routes. Finally, our exam-

ination of bilateral and multilateral Chinese, Japanese and Korean diplomatic activity concerning

Arctic shipping exhibits a lower prole than indicated by earlier studies.

Keywords: maritime transport; Northern Sea Route; Northeast passage; China; Japan;

Korea; polar silk road; Arctic Council

Responsible Editor: Øyvind Ravna, UiT The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø,

Norway

Received: September 2018; Accepted: December 2018; Published: January 2019

Asian Countries and Arctic Shipping: Policies, Interests and Footprints on Governance

25

Introduction

How important are shipping and shipbuilding for the Arctic aspirations of leading

Asian states? How much of their engagement is purely commercial, and how much

is a reection of political goals? We take a bottom-up approach, examining Arctic sea

routes from the perspectives of Asian governmental agencies, companies and indus-

try associations, rather than a top–down approach centered on Arctic change. A

recent study ranked China highest among the leading maritime nations of the world,

with Japan and the Republic of Korea as third and fourth.1 Given the global orien-

tation of their maritime industries, these nations will always assess Arctic options

across a wide array of alternatives.

Since 2013, China, Japan and Korea have enjoyed formal observer status in the

major international forum specically targeting northern affairs, the Arctic Council.2

All three countries emphasize the mutual benets of cooperation with the Arctic

states, but differ signicantly in the salience they ascribe to various maritime business

opportunities, in the centrality of their shipping ministries in Arctic policy develop-

ment, and in the preparedness of their maritime industries to commit themselves

nancially to northern sea routes.

Three alternative transit routes are in focus in debates over trans-Arctic ship-

ping: the Northeast Passage between the Atlantic and the Pacic north of Russia,

the Northwest Passage through Canada’s Arctic archipelago, and the Central Route

across the North Pole. For the near future, it is only the Northeast Passage—

specically, the Northern Sea Route—that has attracted serious interest from Asian

shipping actors.3 The Northwest Passage has depth limitations and remains severely

constrained by permanent or moving ice. Regular use of the Central Route remains a

futuristic scenario, requiring far greater ice retreat than seen so far.4 The “Nor theast

Passage” is the loose term historically applied to the entire Arctic passage between

Europe and Asia: the Northern Sea Route is the clearly demarcated sea area between

the Kara Sea in the west to the Bering Strait in the east, extending 200 nautical miles

from the coast, developed and regulated by Soviet and Russian authorities since the

1930s.5 In addition to its potential as a transit corridor, this route is of interest to

the shipping industry because of transport-intensive resource extraction projects in

the Russian North. Shipping out from the Arctic or into it is termed “destination

shipping,” as distinct from transit shipping between the Pacic and the Atlantic.

Because most studies of Asian-state interest in the Arctic assume that shorter sea-

lanes to Europe are a major driver, we begin by examining the prominence of ship-

ping concerns in the Arctic policy statements of major Asian states.6 Contrary to

the impression left by many analysts, these policy documents—those by Japan and

Korea in particular—reveal soberness rather than optimism with respect to Arctic

sea routes, highlighting the remaining limitations and the need for more in-depth

feasibility studies. This greater caution from policymakers than from analysts can be

explained by our second nding: in Korea and Japan, maritime-sector bureaucracies