Managing Conflict at Sea: The Case of Norway and Russia in the Svalbard Zone

• Author: Andreas Østhagen
• Position: Research Fellow, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Oslo, Norway; PhD-candidate, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada
• Pages: 147-170

100

Arctic Review on Law and Politics

Vol. 9, 2018, pp. 100–123

*Correspondence to: ao@fni.no

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Citation: Andreas Østhagen. ‘Managing Conict at Sea: The Case of Norway and Russia in the Svalbard Zone’’

Arctic Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 9, 2018, pp. 100–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v9.1084

Managing Conict at Sea:

The Case of Norway and Russia

in the Svalbard Zone

Andreas Østhagen*

Research Fellow, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Oslo, Norway; PhD-candidate, University of

British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

Abstract:

In 1977, Norway established a m aritime F isheries Pr otection Zone ( FPZ) arou nd Svalbard, yet

avoided claim ing an outr ight Exclusive Ec onomic Zone (EE Z). A dispute wit h Russia over the

status of the Z one arose. In the late 1990s , Norwegian en forcement of sheries r egulations bec ame

stricter, as sh stocks were in de cline. Thi s led the Norweg ian Coast Gua rd to attempt to arr est

Russian shing vessels on several occasions, resulting in reactions from Russian shermen, as well

as ofcia ls in Murma nsk and Moscow. In 1998, 2001, 2005, and 2011 specically, incident s had

the potentia l to escalate beyond a she ries issue. Today, an event in the ma ritime zone is of conc ern

to both Norweg ian and Russ ian authorit ies. Given the pot ential volatil ity of events in t he FPZ,

how do Norway and Ru ssia manage to avoid e scalation in t he case of a crisis? Where as previous

scholarly work has e xplicitly foc used on the lega l status of Svalbard and its mar itime zones, or

looked at how Norway ma nages sheries i n cooperation with Rus sia, this article b rings forth new

knowledge by ex amining the sp ecic incidents in t he Zone and placing the se in the wider context

of conict t heory. Limited to the Norwegian perceptio ns of the dispute on ly, this art icle adds to

our underst anding of this spe cic issue of Arctic c onict management a nd governance. Based on

several yea rs of data collection th rough interv iews, the argument put f orth is that Norweg ian and

Russian cooperation is based on both mutual interests and t he socializ ing effec ts of cooperative

mechanisms, which in t urn are key to avoi d escalation in crisis- scenarios. I nsu m, we need to

recognis e how a combination of economic interests a nd the effec ts of socialis ation have enabled

Norway and Ru ssia to keep conict levels low, when inc idents at sea have occurre d.

Keyword s: Russia; Norway; Svalbard Zone; coast guard s; maritime cooperation;

Arcticsecurity; con ict management

Responsible Editor: Øyvind Ravna, UiT - The Arctic University of Nor way, Tromsø,

Nor way.

Received: November 2017; Accepted: April 2018; Published: May 2018

Managing Conict at Sea

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1. Introduction

In 1977, Norway established a maritime Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) around

the archipelago of Svalbard, north of the Norwegian mainland. Norway avoided

claiming an outright Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) fearing it would be chal-

lenged by the global community due to stipulations (or lack thereof) concerning

extended maritime zones in the Svalbard Treaty from 1920.1 Since then, Norway has

managed economic activity in this maritime domain, principally sheries.2 Atthe

turn of the millennium, Norwegian sheries enforcement became stricter, in tandem

with declining sh stocks and fear of considerable IUU (illegal, unreported, and un-

regulated) shing in the Barents Sea. The rst example of this was the attempted ar-

rest of the Russian shing vessel Novokuybyshevsk in 1998. This led to reactions from

Russian shermen, as well as ofcials in both Murmansk and Moscow, which further

peaked on later occasions, when the Norwegian Coast Guard attempted to arrest the

Russian shing vessels Chernigov in 2001, Elektron in 2005, and Sapphire II in 2011.

The risk of events spiralling out of control in the FPZ remains a primary concern for

both the Norwegian Coast Guard and the Norwegian Ministry of Defence.3 Echoing

these fears, in 2017 the Russian Defence Ministry deemed Svalbard a potential area

for future conict with Norway, and in consequence NATO.4

Carving oceans into zones of national ownership is a recent endeavour, solidi-

ed with the United Nations Law of the Sea Conventions (UNCLOS) in the 1970s

and 80s. Today, marine resources are gaining attention, as the world continues to

seek food, energy and rare earth minerals.5 With this attention, focus has also shifted

to maritime disputes, many left unresolved due to limited popular and economic

interest when they arose decades ago.6 This article grapples with the overarching

topic of conict and dispute management between states at sea. By using one specic

case of dispute management between Norway and Russia, we can attempt to better

understand factors underpinning maritime conict management.

Given the potential volatility of events in the FPZ, how have Norway and Russia

managed to avoid escalation in the case of crisis? Asking why something has not

occurred – i.e. outright conict in the FPZ – is inherently more difcult than asking

why something has occurred.7 This question is worth asking, however, in order to

improve our understanding of the complexities concerning this maritime dispute,

which involves resource management in the context of larger security concerns. In

turn, a study of this particular issue can enable us to better understand conict man-

agement at sea.

This article is based on several years of data collection (2014-2017) through

interviews with Norwegian Coast Guard ofcials, ofcials at the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and Ministry of Defence in Norway, as well as former Norwegian Navy and

Coast Guard ofcers. It also leans on previous scholarly work concerned with Rus-

sia, Norway, maritime disputes, and sheries. Several scholars have grappled with

these issues before – most notably Pedersen8, Hønneland9, Jørgensen10, Molenaar11,