Russian Certainty of NATO Hostility: Repercussions in the Arctic

• Author: Julie Wilhelmsen, Anni Roth Hjermann
• Position: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Norway/Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Norway
• Pages: 114-142

© 2022 Julie Wilhelmsen & Anni Roth Hjermann. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative

Commons CC-BY4.0 License. eISSN 2387-4562. https://arcticreview.no.

Citation: Julie Wilhelmsen & Anni Roth Hjermann. “Russian Certainty of NATO Hostility: Repercussions in the Arctic”

Arctic Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 13, 2022, pp. 114–142. http://dx.doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v13.3378

Arctic Review on Law and Politics

Vol. 13, 2022, pp. 114–142

114

*Correspondence to: Julie Wilhelmsen, e-mail: jw@nupi.no

Peer-reviewed article

Russian Certainty of NATO Hostility:

Repercussions in the Arctic

Julie Wilhelmsen* & Anni Roth Hjermann

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Norway

Abstract

How does a security dilemma dynamic between parties deemed not to hold hostile intentions

toward each other emerge and escalate? This article investigates Russian ofcial discourse on

NATO engagement in Europe post-Crimea (2014), and its impact on security interaction in the

Arctic. We also examine how Russia represents NATO intentions and actions in a context seen

by Russia as a relation of war. We identify the effect of these changing representations of self and

other for the emerging securitization dilemma in relations between Russia and NATO, arguing

that they have replaced uncertainty about NATO’s hostile intentions with certainty. Although

Russia still articulates the Arctic as a unique cooperative region, there may be little space left for

non-conictual Russian action when encountering NATO in the Arctic. We highlight the agency

and importance of evolving political rhetoric in creating a dangerous situation where lethal conict

can occur between parties who do not seek it, and also suggest that adjustments to patterns of

ofcial speech could be a tool of mitigation.

Keywords: Russia, NATO, security dilemma, discourse, Arctic

Responsible Editor: Njord Wegge, Norwegian Defence University College, Norway

Received: July 2021; Accepted: December 2021; Published: March 2022

1 Introduction

After the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea, Russia and NATO seem

locked in a pattern of escalating tension. With talk of a new Cold War, even an

arms race, the re-militarization of Europe is underway, also in the Arctic. The

low-tension space between Russia and NATO has rapidly been supplanted by mil-

itary exercises, bases and installations, all growing in number and scope. Whereas

security experts and bureaucracies on both sides have engaged in measuring

Russian Certainty of NATO Hostility

115

the “threat” in objective terms, often taking for granted the hostile intent of the

adversary, this article examines how the understanding of the other as hostile and

threatening has (re-) emerged. We see the social interaction between the parties as

the fundamental driver in conictual relations, with the material manifestations

of such relations being re-armament and military posturing enabled by inimical

identications.

The spiral of rising tension in Europe is part of a broader Russia–West interaction

pattern which can be theorized as a process of mutual and multifaceted securitiza-

tion,1 but we focus on Russia, investigating the changing identications of NATO in

the wider context of self/other representations in Russian ofcial texts. We theorize

and empirically investigate the changing pattern in post-Crimea ofcial statements

on the strategic adversary and how such general securitization spills over into Russia’s

framing of NATO in the Arctic. Thereby we address a neglected aspect in discussions

on the emerging Russia-West security dilemma(s): how uncertainty about the intent

behind the other party’s military build-up2 has dissolved and become certainty.

Some scholars see the basic objectives of NATO and Russia in the Arctic as

defensive, and explain the “tragic” action/reaction pattern in military build-up now

unfolding with reference to longstanding psychological, bureaucratic and political

biases and assumptions,3 or a general lack of trust.4 While acknowledging that his-

torical animosity is relevant, we disagree with both the weight that it is given, as

well as shallow accounts of how today’s distrust is (re-) produced. We argue that the

power of recent political speech – including rhetoric that invokes historical animosity

– must be considered in explaining how parties replace strategic uncertainty about

the intent behind the other party’s actions with certainty of hostile intent – thus con-

tributing to the action/reaction dynamic involving military activities and potentially

leading to armed conict.5 Moreover, spillover of strategic certainty from one area

(Ukraine/Black Sea) to another (Arctic) occurs as a result of a discursive process in

which the Other has been naturalized as a total threat.

Empirically, our study contributes fresh insight into a main protagonist on the

rapidly changing European scene, as well as how Russia’s expressed views on NATO

might affect relations in the Arctic. The Arctic has long been considered a strate-

gic low-tension zone, featuring cross-cutting institutions focused on non-military

issue-areas, with agreement on the primacy of UNCLOS and a healthy mix of col-

laboration and competition in the energy eld.6 Even immediately after the annex-

ation of Crimea, Russia and NATO states remained “frenemies” in the Arctic,7

an area now increasingly dominated by great-power rivalry where Russia–NATO

interactions are pivotal. Can the Arctic can be “compartmentalized” and insulated

from broader developments in Russia–West relations?8 By reviewing a large body

of Russian ofcial texts on NATO since 2014 and examining how relations in the

Arctic are re-read in light of this broader discursive change, we indicate how com-

partmentalization could be challenged by Russian strategic certainty of NATO’s

hostile intent.