The Northern Sea Route in the 2010s: Development and Implementation of Relevant Law

• Author: Jan Solski
• Position: Norwegian Centre for the Law of the Sea
• Pages: 215-242

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Citation: Jan Jakub Solski. “The Northern Sea Route in the 2010s: Development and Implementation of Relevant Law”

Arctic Review on Law and Politics, Vol. 11, 2020, pp. 383–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v11.2374

Arctic Review on Law and Politics

Vol. 11, 2020, pp. 383–410

383

*Correspondence to: Jan Jakub Solski, email: jan.solski@uit.no

Peer-reviewed article

The Northern Sea Route in the 2010s:

Development and Implementation

of Relevant Law

Jan Jakub Solski

Norwegian Centre for the Law of the Sea, UiT The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø,

Norway

Abstract

The 2010s was a busy decade for the Northern Sea Route (NSR). It started with the rst shipping

season to feature the international use of the NSR for commercial purposes, followed by a signi-

cant reform of the domestic legal regime, as well as the adoption of the Polar Code. The trafc has

gradually picked up, and although the expectations of a signicant surge in trans-Arctic navigation

have not materialized, the NSR’s annual turnover has grown beyond the old records set by the

USSR. While the Russian authorities have struggled to nd the most optimal means of develop-

ment of the NSR, the latter has recently been re-marketed as a Polar Silk Road, part of the grand

Chinese One Belt One Road initiative. While Russia has been rebuilding its military presence in

the Arctic, the French Navy vessel BSAH Rhone unexpectedly navigated through the NSR, inciting

strong political, but yet not legal, response.

The present article aims to take stock of the last decade, paying primary attention to the Russian

State practice in developing, adopting, and enforcing legislation in the NSR. By describing the cur-

rent status and identifying some of the regulatory trends, the article will draw cautious predictions

on the role of the law of the sea in the management of the NSR in the near future.

Keywords: Northern Sea Route; Arctic; law of the sea; Polar Silk Road

Responsible Editor: Nigel Bankes, Faculty of Law, University of Calgary, Canada

Received: May 2020; Accepted: September 2020; Published: December 2020

1 Introduction

The 2010s (1 January 2010–31 December 2019) was a busy decade for the North-

ern Sea Route (NSR). It started with the rst shipping season to feature interna-

tional use of the NSR for commercial purposes, followed by a signicant reform

Jan Jakub Solski

384

of the domestic legal regime, as well as the adoption of the International Code for

Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code).1 Shipping trafc has gradually picked

up, and although the expected signicant surge in trans-Arctic navigation has not

yet materialized, the NSR’s annual turnover has grown beyond the old records set

by the USSR. While the Russian authorities have struggled to nd the most optimal

means to develop the NSR, the latter has recently been re-branded as the Polar Silk

Road (PSR), part of the grand Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While Russia

has been rebuilding its military presence in the Arctic, the French Navy vessel BSAH

Rhone unexpectedly navigated through the NSR, inciting a strong political, but not

yet legal, response.

It is common to consider 1 January 1991, when the 1990 Regulations entered

into force,2 as the date of the formal opening of the NSR to foreign vessels. Although

this was certainly a milestone political decision, it did not result in revolutionary

changes regarding actual use. It seems that falling cargo turnover in the decades

after the collapse of the Soviet Union was just another victim of the abrupt economic

transition within the country. It would be difcult to expect a surge in foreign ship-

ping through the NSR when the domestic cargo turnover plummeted approximately

fourfold between 1987 and 1998.3

At the same time, Russia’s hesitance to tailor national legislation to truly accom-

modate international interests effectively discouraged international use of the NSR.4

The cost of obligatory services and other burdensome requirements on ships criti-

cally hindered the prospect of the commercial viability of this route.5

However, the NSR was never ofcially closed to international shipping, at least de

jure.6 In line with the biblical wisdom “you will know them by their fruit”, one may

as well view 2010 as marking the real opening of the NSR. After all, it was the rst

shipping season that featured international use of the NSR for commercial purposes

(by and for foreigners, i.e., by foreign-agged ships and/or for shipping to/from a

foreign port), preceded by the exploratory voyages of the MV Beluga Fraternity and

the MV Beluga Foresight in 2009.7

In the 2010s, Russia set its course to convert the NSR into a route of global

signicance for world trade, an international artery able to compete with other tra-

ditionally used seaways in all respects.8 The development of the NSR has remained

a priority for Russia’s maritime policy, as set out in the 2001 Maritime Doctrine,9

as well as the revised version adopted as the 2015 Maritime Doctrine.10 The doc-

uments that articulate Russian Arctic policy, such as the 2008 Basics of Arctic

Policy,11 the 2013 Arctic Development Strategy12 and the 2020 Basics of Arctic

Policy13 all emphasize the signicance of Russia’s national interests concerning the

NSR, the need for centralized management, and the provision of non-discriminatory

access to the NSR, including for foreign vessels.14

The present article aims to take stock of the last decade, paying primary attention

to Russian State practice in developing, adopting, and enforcing legislation in the