U.S. Marines and NATO's Northern Flank

• Author: Lon Strauss, Ryan Gordinier, Michael Byrne
• Position: U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, USA/U.S. Marine Corps, USA/Independent researcher / U.S. Marine Corps (retired), USA
• Pages: 72-93

Arctic Review on Law and Politics

Vol. 13, 2022, pp. 72–93

72

Peer-reviewed article

© 2022 Lon Strauss, Ryan Gordinier and Michael Byrne. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the

Creative Commons CC-BY 4.0 License. eISSN 2387-4562. https://arcticreview.no.

Citation: Lon Strauss, Ryan Gordinier and Michael Byrne. “U.S. Marines and NATO’s Northern Flank” Arctic Review on

Law and Politics, Vol. 13, 2022, pp. 72–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v13.3381

*Correspondence to: Lon Strauss, e-mail: lon.strauss@usmcu.edu

U.S. Marines and NATO’s Northern

Flank

Lon Strauss*

U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, USA

Ryan Gordinier

U.S. Marine Corps, USA

Michael Byrne

Independent researcher / U.S. Marine Corps (retired), USA

Abstract

The U.S. Department of the Navy released A Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic on 5 January 2021.

The Navy is focused on preparing for an Alaskan and “Blue” Arctic. Recognizing the changing

landscape of the Arctic, the US Navy seeks to maintain a competitive edge, freedom of the seas,

and deterrent effect. For the Marine Corps, both the 2021 document and the previous Advantage

at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power, highlight the Marines’ mission to assist

the Navy in sea control and sea denial. These strategic documents reect the direction both the

Navy and Marine Corps are taking to better engage in the Arctic, and, therefore on NATO’s north-

ern ank and elsewhere in the world. The Marine Corps’ new concept for warghting, represented

in The Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) presumes that Marines

are a “stand-in” force, i.e., they are already in areas within an adversary’s weapon’s engagement

zone (WEZ). However, this is not the case on NATO’s northern ank, where Marines conduct

training with NATO and under bilateral agreements. In order to better understand how these new

concepts and strategic documents inuence the USMC’s engagement on NATO’s northern ank,

it is important to relate them to the overall strategic context in this region, as well as the possible

gaps that exist down to include operational and some tactical levels implications.

Keywords: EABO, US Arctic Strategy, USMC, NATO’s Northern Flank, Force Design 2030

Responsible Editor: Njord Wegge, Norwegian Defence University College, Norway

Received: July 2021; Accepted: February 2022; Published: March 2022

** The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reect the ofcial policy

or position of the US Marine Corps, Department of Defense, or the US Government.

U.S. Marines and NATO’s Northern Flank

73

In October and November 2018, the U.S. Marine Corps’ 24th Marine Expeditionary

Unit (MEU) participated in the NATO exercise Trident Juncture, the largest

NATO exercise since 2002. Along with NATO allies, the Marines conducted an

amphibious landing and air assault in Norway. At that time, Marines brought M1A1

Abrams tanks and a number of vehicles and equipment that they no longer have.

Heavy tanks, while denitely having difculties in cold weather operations, also

have a distinct advantage. They can create roadways where there previously were

not any. Tracked vehicles, crunching down and packing the snow, can traverse over

thickly frozen lakes or terrain that the snow attened out where it would be hillier

and more difcult to negotiate in warmer weather. However, this traditional frame-

work is no longer a reality for the Marine Corps. General David H. Berger, the 38th

Commandant of the Marine Corps since 11 July 2019, has signed a new Force Design

2030 (FD 2030) and issued his Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG). He is

moving the Marine Corps away from being heavier, with tanks, toward “presenting

a light posture, sustaining themselves in an austere setting, and protecting them-

selves from detection and targeting” with a “diminished reliance on xed bases

and easily targetable infrastructure.”1 He envisions the Marine Corps becom-

ing a lighter reconnaissance/counter reconnaissance force. Doing so has altered

the Marines’ capabilities and what NATO can expect of them on their northern

ank. The Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 and Expeditionary Advanced Base

Operations (EABO) concept are Indo-Pacic focused and, therefore, create some

inconsistencies when evaluated alongside the strategic context of NATO’s north-

ern ank and US strategic documents. This in turn has operational and capability

implications for how the Marine Corps will operate with NATO on their northern

ank.2

Methodologically, for a study on the Marine Corps’ shift toward a new concept

and its implications for NATO’s northern ank, it is vitally important that such a

work evaluate the Service’s new conceptual documents alongside the Department of

the Navy’s Arctic policy and the United States’ other strategic texts. Additionally, it

is valuable to understand not only the context of strategic competition and regional

concerns that might draw the United States, specically the Marine Corps, into a

conict on NATO’s northern ank, but also the assumptions that these documents

express for a possible intervention.3 The current study applies a qualitative approach

to these documents along with personal experience that some of the authors’ gained

from military exercises in Northern Norway. Since the focus is on the Marine Corps’

concepts within a national strategic context and the possible implications therein,

the current evaluation will naturally ow from the strategic level to operational,

and even tactical, concerns. While the authors will focus on the Marine Corps and

NATO’s northern ank, the analysis will be put on the larger, strategic context of

global great power competition. Additionally, the authors’ intent is not to propose

solutions to problems, but to highlight some important inconsistencies when a US